Title: Trading off Strategyproofness and Efficiency of Assignment Mechanisms
Abstract: There are some things that money cannot buy, like access to the best public schools, entry level positions for medical graduates, or internships at NGOs.
For moral and ethical reasons, society has decided to set boundaries regarding the use of money for resources that affect our health, our education, or our work situation.
In domains like these, where resources are scarce and monetary transfers are restricted, we face an assignment problem, where people and objects must be assigned to each other.
As mechanism designers, we care for assignment mechanisms that are strategyproof, efficient, and fair.
Unfortunately, prior research has shown that reaching the optimum on all three dimensions is impossible, which makes the assigment problem an interesting market design challenge.
The goal of my PhD thesis is to expand our understanding of the possible and necessary trade-offs between strategyproofness and efficiency for assignment mechanisms, subject to fairness requirements.
